The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship

URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199009%2984%3A3%3C849%3ATTATTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

Abstract:

I use basic tools of economic theory to construct a simple model of the behavior of dictatorships. Two extreme cases are considered: a @'tin-pot@' dictatorship, in which the dictator wishes only to minimize the costs of remaining in power in order to collect the fruits of office (palaces, Mercedes-Benzes, Swiss bank accounts), and a @'totalitarian@' dictatorship, whose leader maximizes power over the population. I show that the two differ in their responses to economic change. For example, a decline in economic performance will lead a tin-pot regime to increase its repression of the population, whereas it will lead to totalitarian government to reduce repression. The model also shows why military dictatorships (a subspecies of tin-pots) tend to be short-lived and often voluntarily hand power over to a civilian regime; explains numerous features of totalitarian regimes; and suggests what policies will enable democratic regimes to deal with dictatorships effectively.

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